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Recognizing the tenuous position that the Republic of
Korea maintains with regard to communist North Korea, the
Korean Air Force, as a first line of defense, must maintain
the highest level of air combat readiness, the crux of which
is the combat effectiveness of its pilots. Through research
of past studies, the determinants of the combat effective
pilot, combat skills and psychological characteristics, were
identified and broken down into component factors, which
have positive effect on combat effectiveness and implica-
tions for pilot selection, training, and assignment. NPS
Korean Air Force students were surveyed as to their percep-
tions of these factors as they relate to combat effective-
ness and their own experience. This activity served as a
primitive model for possible expert systems determination of
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I. INTRODUCTION
Today, the significance of air combat readiness for
national defense is more critical than ever before, as air
forces become more modern and powerful. The latest wars; the
Lebanese conflict, the Falkland war, the Iran/Iraq war, " and
the USA/Libya conflict have each shown its critical
significance. The result is each country trying to increase
its air combat readiness level through additional combat
pilots, state-of-the-art aircraft, sophisticated weapon
systems, early warning systems, and electronic warfare
systems, etc. However, it is impossible to acquire all to
the levels desired because of the many economic,
technological, and human resource constraints. Accordingly,
a country must find the most efficient and effective way to
increase total air combat readiness level in keeping with
those constraints.
The best way to achieve increased air power may be to
secure more combat effective pilots, since they are the
operators of all other systems. A failure to secure those
combat effective pilots may make other enhancement efforts
meaningless.
The issue of increasing air combat readiness is particu-
larly significant to the Korean Air Force (KAF) because the
KAF is inferior in size to the Air Force of communist North
Korea. The securing of more combat effective pilots for
increased air combat readiness may be the most urgent issue
in KAF, under the assumption that pilot quality control will
be able to overcome inferiority in numbers.
The critical significance of an air combat readiness for
Korean national defense, the value of the combat effective
pilot, and measures for the pilot quality in the KAF as
brought out by a profile of the combat effective pilot are
11
the main focus of this thesis. Specifically, NPS Korean
pilots sample data will be used to demonstrate a quality
difference among these pilots and to suggest research possi-
bilities for assessing potentially combat effective pilots
based on their psychological characteristics and special
combat skills, as introduced in the McDonnell research
team's final report (1977). The McDonnell team's report
will be referenced heavily in determining an effective
pilot's profile and its supporting criteria.
Although the populace expects victory in case of war,
even when their forces are inferior, desire does not assure
victory. There is no substitute for an active, in place,
effective force in times of hostility. This research will
attempt to provide a step toward increasing air combat read-
iness of the KAF, and promoting further KAF research activi-
ties in the quest for maximum air combat effectiveness.
Revisiting this area with a larger and more controlled
sample of KAF pilot data could prove valuable in the study
of pilot quality in the KAF, particularly when considered in
light of different social backgrounds, military systems, and
environmental situations.
12
II. ME COMBAT READINESS
A. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF AIR POWER
1. The Role of an Air Force
The challenges that face you in your career in the Air
Force are infinite. We have entered an era where
horizons are, for all intents and purposes, unlimited;
where the pace is unbelievably fast and increasing;
where the threat which we must meet is daily growing. . . .
The above quotation is a part of General Lemay's address on
the occasion of the Third Annual Wright Memorial lecture
concerning the future of the U. S. Air Force [ Ref . 1: p.
216] , and shows the increasing role of Air Forces in
general.
Within three days after the Japanese directed a
crippling air attack on U.S. fleet at Pearl Harbor in 1941,
the two most powerful ships in the Royal NAVY's Far Eastern
Fleet, "Repulse" and "Prince of Wales", had been sunk by
Japanese Torpedo bombers once they sailed beyond the range
of protective air cover. At that time, certain incredulous
western observers insisted that it had been done by German
pilots who had flown a special mission [Ref. 2: p. 85].
That is, they tried to analyze this event from the view of
the special pilot's ability rather than the significance of
Air Power. They firmly believed that absolute Sea Power
remained with fleets. The relevant meaning of this event
was the emergence of a new decisive power in the war.
During World War Two, Japanese war planes blackened
the skies from China to Mongolia, from Australia to
Philippines, from Hawaii to Alaska, from Malaya to Burma,
India, and Ceylon. But Japanese military expansion was soon
stopped when they engaged the Air Power of the United
States. One could predict the result of the war by looking
at the data of Table I.
13
TABLE I
AIRCRAFT PRODUCED IN 1941-1945





* Source: Adapted from "Air Power and Warfare" 91p,
Proceedings of the 8th Military History
Symposium USAF Academy, Oct 1978.
Finally, the Japanese realized the significance of Air Power
at their expense.
Air power has assumed a critical role in present
warfare from the auxiliary role it played for the Army and
Navy at the beginning of World War Two, increasing as its
systems have grown in capability.
Once US Air Power was neutralized by the cease fire
in 1973, the North Vietnamese eventually moved their units
openly and rapidly into South Vietnam. Following President
Ford's rejection of President Thieu's direct request for the
return of American Air Power, communist unification of
Vietnam took place within a short time. Ray L. Bowers, a
retired Air Force colonel, stated that only a massive U. S.
Air intervention, at least on the scale of 1972, could have
saved South Vietnam. His comment supports the assertion
that the U. S. Air Force did not just waste fuel and ammuni-
tion during operations in Vietnam, as many strategists point
out [ Ref. 2: p. 324] .
The increased role of Air Power has been shown more
recently in the Middle East war. The role of the Israeli Air
Force in the Arab- Israeli war is a representative model.
Its superiority was demonstrated in the limited battles with
the Egyptian Air Force in 1956, and in the destruction of
the Egyptian, Jordanian, and Syrian Air Forces in 1967, and
in the absolute supremacy in aerial combat achieved against
14
Egypt and Syria in 1973. Since 1978, dogfights between
Syrian and Israeli aircraft over Lebanon have invariably
ended in the downing of the Syrian planes. In 1982, 90
Syrian planes were shot down as opposed to two Israeli
planes, both downed by anti-aircraft defenses [ Ref . 3: p.
283]. This record is the most plausible reason for Israel's
survival.
During the 10-week confrontation between Britain and
Argentina in 1982, the world attention focused on the
conflict to see what lessons could be learned. Had they
bought the right equipment for their own services, and would
they be able to use it efficiently and effectively if they
encountered a similar crisis? The Falkland war showed the
significance of Air Power again. The activity of the
Harrier, Britain's v/stol aircraft, was a highlight of the
Falkland war victory. Reginald Turnill said that without
these unique aircraft, it is certain that the Defense Staff
would never have agreed to the task force being sent to the
Falklands (Britain could not have expected victory) [Ref. 4:
p. 26] . Air Power had the same meaning for Argentina as
well. Although they lost the war, their Air Force suffi-
ciently demonstrated the power of a modern Air Force.
Specifically, the World was surprised when Argentinian
aircraft sank the Britain's H. M. S. 1 Sheffield which was
equiped with a modern air defense system.
Today, it is not the time of the Ground or Sea
conqueror, but the time of the Air conqueror. Air Forces
will take a decisive role in future war because of its char-
acteristics (rapidity, flexibility, fire power, mobility,
etc )
.
*H. M. S. - His/Her Majesty's ship.
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Sir Winston Churchill expressed his thoughts about
the role of Air Power with brevity and clarity after World
War Two [ Ref . 1: p. 91]
.
Air mastery is today the supreme expression of Military
power. Fleets and Armies, however necessary, must accept
a subordinate rank.
2. Air Power of Selected Countries
S. L. A. Marshall, retired Brigadier General, USA,
said that Military systems advance most easily and at lowest
cost by watching well what others do somewhat better
[Ref. 5: p. 28]. So, observing others is an appropriate
starting point for the endeavour to look upon our current
position and to improve our air combat readiness.
As Churchill foretold, the new decisive role of Air
Power has manifested itself since World War Two. Now, most
countries are trying to expand and modernize their Air
Forces, and this trend will not change unless they believe
they enjoy superiority of air power in a war.
a. Israel Case
The Israeli Air Force has always enjoyed highest
priority in the development of Israel's military power. This
priority stems in part from the fact that most of the IDF is
a militia army. Israeli Air Power is built largely on
standing forces and on a high state of alert, meant to
compensate for the shortage of regular ground forces and to
provide protection while reserve units are mobilized and
deployed for battle. The IAF, as a central component of
Israel's military power, has traditionally been allocated a
large share of Israel's financial resources and sophisti-
cated manpower [Ref. 3: p. 284]. Consequently, they have
focused on getting higher quality aircraft and people
instead of focusing on quantity and have one of the world'
s
most modern and capable Air Forces.
16
b. Arab Countries
Table II shows the major Air Forces of the Middle East.
TABLE II
MAJOR AIR FORCE OF THE MIDDLE EAST
Personnel Intercepters Strike &
(thousands) Multi role a/c Total
Country combat
Reg/Res Tot High Others High Others a/c
Qual' Qual'
~1983~110/2i"l35~ ~280~ ~132~ "lio" ~612~
Egypt 1984 110/25 135 - 310 190 120 635
1983 35/- '35 70 - + 80 150
Iran 1984 35/- 35 10 - + 70 80
1983 40/- 40 25 200 185 60 500
Iraq 1984 40/- 40 25 200 195 95 532
1983 30/50 80 40 - 445 185 670
Israel 1984 30/50 80 40 - 415 185 640
1983 7/- 7 60 75 275 10 470
Libya 1984 9/- 9 60 75 315 40 510
1983 70/38 108 50 280 160 110 600
Syria 1984 90/38 128 50 310 190 100 650
Saudi 1983 15/- 15 20 35 - 95 150
Arabia_1984 15/- 15 60_ _35_ _-_ 11 _205_
* Source; Mark Heller. "The Middle East
Military Balance'1 , 1984.
REF: "+ indicates a precise number unknown
- indicates no entry.
Arab Air Forces have not been able to achieve
air superiority, nor have they played a significant role in
the ground battles. Nevertheless, they have powerful Air
Forces and have been trying to modernize continuously.
Syria, Egypt, and Libya are aware that, in order to decide
the land battle, a massive participation by the Air Force is
necessary, despite the fact they had not achieved victory in
past Middle East wars. So, a large number of advanced
aircraft (MIG-23, MIG-25, SUKOI-20, SUKOI-22, etc) have been
acquired recently [ Ref . 3: p. 234]. Generally, most of the
Arab countries (except Iran) are trying to expand, and
modernize their Air Forces, suggesting that in a future war,
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Arab Air Forces may attempt to play a much larger role than
they have before.
c. Iran/Iraq case
The status of the Iranian Air Force within the
last 8 years is shown in Table III.
TABLE III
THE STATUS OF IRANIAN AIR FORCE 1978-1985
Year Personnel Combat A/C
1978 100,000 459 ( 56: F-14/177: F-4E included)
447 77: F-14/190: F-4D,E )1979 100,000
1980 70,000 445 I 77: F-14/188: F-4D,E " )
1981 35,000 100 (serviceable?)
1982 35,000 90 (serviceable?)
1983 35,000 70 (serviceable?)
1984 35,000 95 (serviceable?)
1985 35,000 80 (serviceable?)
* Source: Adapted from "The Military Balance". 1979-1985,
The international institute for strategic studies.
One can see a significant decline of the Iranian Air Force
since 1980. Following the fall of the Shah, Iran did little
for their Air Force except drive out many senior officers
and pilots, and, as a result, the size of the Iranian Air
Force declined over 50 percent. The Iranian Air Force has
been so decimated that it can no longer play a significant
role in the Iran-Iraq war ( 1980-Present) . A level has been
reached where F-14s, one of the most capable intercepters,
have been converted to a primarily air borne radar role,
with no interception capability [ Ref . 3: p. 313].
In contrast, The Iraqi Air Force has assumed an
increasing important role in the Iran-Iraq war with its
retained Air Power [Ref. 6: p. 262]. Its role has become
particularly critical for defense after Iranian's offensive
ground attack began in 1982. Iraqi Air Force should improve
with a national concern for it as the most powerful defense.
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d. USA and Soviet Case
Expansion of American Air power began in Jan
1939 with President Roosevelt's direct request 2 for expan-
sion of Air Power, and Congressional authorization of a
three fold expansion of the Air corps just before World War
Two (Table IV).
TABLE IV
U.S. ARMY AIR CORPS EXPANSION AUTHORIZATION (1939)
.Aircrafts Officers Enlisted Men







* Source: Adapted from "Air Power and Warfare" 75p, 1978.
This expansion of the Air Corps foretold of America's defi-
nite air superiority during World War Two. But, the situ-
ation has changed recently. At present time, the United
States is inferior to the Soviet Union in absolute terms of
the size of Air Force and the number of aircraft. The
Soviets produce and deploy systems in great quantity for
themselves, customers and allies. They have been building,
on average, over 1,200 fighters per year for the past five
years [ Ref . 7: p. 46], and this number might influence the
Air Force of the communist block countries and some Arab
countries, since Soviets are the major arms merchant in the
Third world (Table V).
The USA has negated the numeric inferiority by
the higher quality (aircraft, weapon systems, electronic
warfare systems, etc. ) and this approach has been proven in
the recent Lebanon War (1982). But, this challenge becomes
more difficult as the sophistication of Soviet weapon
2 our existing forces are so utterly inadequate that
they must be immediately strengthened , The State of the
Union message to Congress.
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TABLE V
ARMS DELIVERIES TO DEVELOPING COUNTRIES( %) , 1979-1983
"item" uisR USA
Anti-Air Artillery 39 3
Supersonic combat a/c 56 14
Subsonic combat a/c 33 31
Other fixed-wing a/c 17 5
Helicopters 50 9
Surface-to-Air missile 57 23
* Source: Adapted from "World Military Expenditures
and Arms Transfer
, U.S. Arms Control
and Disarmament Agency, 1985.
systems and aircraft capabilities grow. For example,
sophisticated aircraft like the SU-27 Flanker and MIG-29
Fulcrum, which are equivalent to the F-15 and F-16, are
currently being introduced; both possessing advanced weapon
systems-modern radar, missiles that can attack from any
aspect, and sophisticated electronic-warfare systems
[ Ref . 7: p. 46] . We can see from the Appendix A that the
USAF is trying to increase both the quantity and quality of
its Forces to correspond with the Soviet's expansion and
modernization.
e. Conclusion
Table VI presents the strength of several
national air forces and the sizes. It indicates that most
of the countries have Air Forces which represent over 10% of
their total military forces. T. R. Milton, retired general,
USAF, mentioned the special priority of Air Power of the
Arabs, Israelis, and Chinese, all of whom anticipate being
involved in a war [ Ref. 2: p. 308] .
Because of wartime experience and Air Power's
growing capability, most countries consider it the most
20
TABLE VI
WORLD'S NATIONAL AIR FORCE SIZE
COUNTRY ITEMS COUNTRY ITEMS
U.S. : GDP(1984)= $3619.2 bn
DEFW ff 1= $258. 2 bn
TOTAL REG'= 2,151,568
AIR FORCE = 603,898
& 3700 a/c
USSR: *GNP( 1984 )=$1672-1920 bnt $:
*DEF'( " 1= $295 bn
TOTAL REG'= 5,300,000
AIR FORCE = 570,000
& 5900 a/c
JAPAN: GDP( 1983 )=$1, 983 bn
DEFW 1984)=$l2. 02 bn
TOTAL REG'= 243,000
AIR FORCE = 44,000
& 270 a/c
CHINA: = $309-362 bn*GNP( 1984)
DEFW * 1= $7. 8 bn
TOTAL REG' = 3,900,000
AIR FORCE = 490,000
& 5300 a/c
ISRAEL: GDP( 1984)=$23. 34 bn
*DEF > ( * i=$5. 8 bn
TOTAL REG"= 142,000
AIR FORCE = 28,000
& 684 a/c
EGYPT: *GDP( 1983)= $33.66 bn
*DEFW 1984)=$3. 78 bn
TOTAL REG'= 445,000
AIR FORCE = 25,000
& 427 a/c
LIBYA : GDP(1982)=$29. 86 bnDEFW * i=$0. 709 bn
TOTAL REG'= 74,000
AIR FORCE = 8,500
& 535 a/c
SYRIA: GDP( 1983 )=$19. 745 bn
DEFW 1984)= $3. 21 bn
TOTAL REG'= 402,500
AIR FORCE = 70,000
& 500 a/c
IRAN : GDP( 1983)=$122. 69 bn
*DEF > ( 1984)=$20. 16 bn
TOTAL REG'= 305,000
AIR FORCE = 35,000
& 80 a/c*
IRAQ : *GDP( 1983 )=$30. 556 bn
*DEFW 1984)=$13. 83 bn
TOTAL REG ( = 520,000
AIR FORCE = 40,000
& 500 a/c
KOREA : GDP( 1984)=$83. 22 bn
DEFW ff 1= $4. 49 bn
TOTAL REG*= 598,000
AIR FORCE = 33,000
& 451 a/c
NORTH : *GDP( 1984)=$39. 97 bn
KOREA *DEFW n j=$4. 086 bn
TOTAL REG'= 838,000
AIR FORCE = 53,000
& 800 a/c
TWIAN GDP(1984)=$56. 06 bn
DEFW ff 1=$3. 417 bn
TOTAL REG'= 444,000
AIR FORCE = 77,000
& 567 a/c
ENGLAND: GDP( 1984) =$400. 04 bn
DEFW * [=$21. 4 bn
TOTAL REG*= 327,100
AIR FORCE = 935,600
& 599 a/c
Source: Adapted from "The Military Balance 1984-1985",
The International Institute Strategic Studies.
REF: * indicates an estimate value.
: USSR AND EGYPT AF does not include Air Defense Force.
: The # of a/c is the number of combat aircraft.
decisive implement of the warfare. Major General Lauris
Norstad's writing about the postwar Air Force in 1945
expresses clearly a prudent attitude toward standing Air
Forces [ Ref . 2: p. 216].
Due to training specialization required and increased
production problems of technical equipment, we must have
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sufficient strength in trained personnel and modern
equipment to engage an enemy without being allowed time
to build up an Air Force. In the last two wars we have
fortunately been afforded up to two years to gear for
war. With the character of modern warfare changed so
radically in this last war, particularly by new weapons,
in the next war we will be in the midst of an all-out
war from the start. Our only salvation will be in imme-
diately available modern weapons with sufficient
personnel adequately trained in their use
B. AIR COMBAT READINESS MODEL
Having above considered the role of the modern Air Force
and each country's apparent desire for Air Power, the next
task is to determine an appropriate analytical approach to
developing a combat readiness model. Air Combat Readiness
presents a composite picture of Air Power, since it is not
only a function of absolute size of Air Forces, but a func-
tion of all relevant factors contributing to Air Power.
There is a clear difference between the degree of Air Combat
Readiness and the size of the Forces, such that one can not
estimate the level of Air Combat Readiness by merely
counting the number of aircraft or number of billets. In a
hierarchical sense [ Ref . 8: p. 4] ,
(1) Air Combat Readiness is a function of total system
combat effectiveness.
(2) Total system combat effectiveness is a function of a
sub system combat effectiveness
(3) Sub system combat effectiveness is a function of sub
system output.
(4) Sub system output is a function of sub system
elements and attributes.
Therefore, one can construct a model of Air Combat Readiness
by using sub- system elements and attributes, and we can
assume all sub-system elements and attributes have a posi-
tive effect on the attainment of Air Combat Readiness.
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An Air Combat Readiness model can be expressed as the
following mathematical function.
W = F ( f ( f ' ( £" ( p, w, a, e, r, m ) ) ) )
where W = the level of Air Combat Readiness
F = a certain function
f, f ' , f" = sub-functions
p = pilot's ability
w = weapon system capability
a = aircraft capability
e = electronic system capability
r = radar( early warning and intercept)
system capability
m = maintenance ability
etc.
This expression indicates that an air combat readiness level
will be determined by pilot's ability, aircraft capability,
and weapon systems, etc. To enhance or improve on the meas-
ures of any of the factors is to increase total Air Combat
Readiness.
The need for maximum Air Combat Readiness is more
pressing than ever before in terms of its potential influ-
ence in wartime. However, readiness goals can not continue
to be achieved through budget, hardware, and manpower alone
because of constraining economic and demographic factors.
These goals are, nevertheless, the absolute requirement for
victory. Therefore, we must find the best method to measure
and increase the level of Air Combat Readiness efficiently
and effectively.
Our focus will be made on a 'pilot ability' among those
relevant sub-factors, as the pilot draws all other factors
together in order to attain the desired level of performance
and readiness. A pilot's ability will be the most crucial
factor of air combat readiness unless all aircraft are
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configured as Remote Pilot Vehicles (RPV). A detailed
discussion of the correlation of combat pilot and air combat
readiness will be presented in the next section.
C. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE COMBAT PILOT TO AIR COMBAT
READINESS
1. Theoretical Research
In 1984, Mr. R. Blankert and CAPT N. Powel presented
an analysis of aircraft/weapon/pilot performance related to
Air superiority, in an effort to determine which factor had
the greatest effect on performance. 3 The following two
conclusions [ Ref . 10: pp. 35, 43] emerged from a case
analysis
:
1. Case 1 (fix two variables with medium values,
change one variable) analysis:
- Most effect seen with changes in pilots, next with
weapons, and least with aircraft.
- Aircraft performance parameters had little effect.
- If RED deploys average pilot or average weapons,
BLUE probability of survival is not sufficient.
2. Case 2 ( fix one BLUE variable with medium value and
change other variables, with fix all RED variables at
medium values) analysis:
- The difference between good and poor pilots is
accentuated by better weapons and aircraft.
- The combination of the best weapon and the best
pilot produced the highest Ps and largest K; Ps means
a probability of survival, K means the expected
number of kills.
- Aircraft performance does not seem to significantly
influence result.
- Weapon performance and aircraft performance do not
influence each other.
- Most performance improvement is provided by
improvement in the pilot.
One can see the most important factor is "the combat pilot"
among the factors relevant to Air superiority which in turn
can serve as a measure of Air Combat Readiness.
3They applied three factors ( aircraft. weapon systems,
and pilot) into an imaginative air combat between RED and
BLUE side.
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A similar kind of analysis has been introduced also,
in Chaput's analysis of the past four representative air
battles (Table VII).
TABLE VII
AIR COMBAT WIN-LOSS CORRELATIONS
WINNER LOSER
MOST l LEAST MOST LEAST
DECISIVE DECISIVE DECISIVE DECISIVE
Leb" Yom Kor 1 Viet' Leb* Yom' Kor' Viet'
Relevant war Kippur war war war Kippur war war
Factors ISR ISR U. S U. S SYR EGY/SYR NKOR NVN




YES YES YES YES NO NO NO NO
Weapon effect- YES YES yes ;MARGIN- NO NO NO NO
iveness INAL
Aggressive YES YES YES NO NO YES NO NO
tactics
Situation YES YES YES FAIR YES YES YES YES
awareness
performance YES NO NO NO NO YES YES YES
superiority
Numerical NO NO NO YES YES YES YES NO
superiority
* Source : Armand J. Chaput, History Benefits Next
Generation Fighter Design
,
Aerospace America, May 1984.
Analysis of these encounters has identified winning and
losing factors that may bear on the future, and indicate
that superior pilot skill correlates with "Winner" in Table
VII. Although the other factors such as weapon system,
aircraft capability, tactics, and numerical superiority are
important as well, Chaput's analysis has confirmed the crit-
ical significance of pilots' ability in air combat.
Concerning the 1982 Lebanon Bekka Valley air campaign
between Israel and Syria, Chaput states [ Ref . 9: p. 49].
Clearly, the technical capability of those air planes
(F-15, F-16) were a factor in the rout, but the Israelis
probably would have won without such superior machines.
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2. lUs Significance of. a Combat Pilot' s Ability
The unbelievable performance of the IAF highlights
the contribution of combat pilot to Air Combat Readiness and
wartime Air superiority. A closer look at the IAF combat
pilot performance versus that of other countries is
instructive.
As a representative example, consider Iraqi combat
pilot performance in the initial Iran-Iraq war. The Iraqi
offensive against Iran began with a massive strike by most
of the Iraqi Air Force in 1980. It was designed to destroy
the Iranian Air Force at its bases, and was modeled after
the Israeli destruction 4 of most of the Egyptian Air Force
on June 5, 1967. Iraq expected to get results similar to
those achieved by the Israelis, but failed except with
respect to a their successful penetration. Besides the
insufficient sorties assigned each target, many bombs did
not explode upon impact, apparently because they were
released improperly, at too low an altitude. In a word,
they lost their decisive advantage of surprise due to the
lack of pilot skill [ Ref . 3: p. 312].
One may try to explain the differences in outcome in
terms of differences in aircraft capability, weapon systems,
and intelligence systems, etc, but would be unable to
explain so big difference in performances without a consid-
eration of combat pilot ability. After the Lebanon Bekka
Valley Battle (1982), one Israel fighter pilot commented
about the Syrian pilot [Ref. 11: p. 9],
they could have flown the best fighter in the world, but
if they flew it the way they were flying, we would have
shot them down in exactly same way.
4 IAF's achievement for the first two days: 309 Egyptian
aircraft. includes 95 MIG-21 and 30 TU-16 was cited at
ARAB- ISRAELI WAR, Edgar 0' Balance, 1972.
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We do not know precisely what way they were flying.
However, we can assume there was a clear difference in
combat pilot ability between IAF and Syrian Air Forces.
Syrian pilots might have entered into the air battle arena
without knowing what to do next, even though they might have
had strong confidence of a victory.
These examples emphasize that the combat pilot's
ability is the most critical factor influencing the level of
Air Combat Readiness as it manifests itself through victory
in air operations. Former USAF Chief of Staff, General John
P. McConnel's thinking supports this conclusion [ Ref . 12:
p. 64]
,
In my opinion, success in battle will never depend
solely on numbers of men or power of weapons, regardless
of the dimension of the war—whether it be a limited war
within the confines of a small country like Vietnam or
an unlimited war fought on a global battle field.
Ultimately, all weapons come under the control of men,
and the knowledge, determination, and courage of those
men will govern how well those weapons will be used.
The combat pilot, especially the effective combat
pilot is our primary study focus, as we seek to achieve Air
Combat Readiness, efficiently and effectively, recognizing
the constraints placed on other factors.
Constructing a profile of the combat effective pilot
as it might apply to pilot quality control is the subject of
Chapter III.
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III. THE COMBAT EFFECTIVE PILOT
A. THE PERFORMANCE OF AN AIR COMBAT EFFECTIVE PILOT
1. The General Combat Pilot
Most pilots, especially combat pilots, have a high
degree of self-confidence and pride with respect to their
particular job, and they know inately that the success of a
mission will depend upon their knowledge, skill, judgement,
courage, etc. Completion of the long training period and the
cost of such training is of itself sufficient cause for
pride. For example, the USAF determined that it will
require more than 2 years and $ 1,020,000 to train an F-15
pilot to become combat ready, and this figure accounts for
only the cost and time required to attain an initial quali-
fication [ Ref . 13: p. 29]. In recognizing and promoting the
special pride, the Korean Air Force issues red mufflers for
pilots while the other officers and enlisted men are issued
blue mufflers.
In addition to their special pride, each pilot
thinks he may be one of his country's best pilots, and that
he can be an Ace ( an exceptionally successful air combat
effective pilot). It may be very desirable for pilots to
have a such confidence and desire to be an ace. We can not
assume that all pilots are combat effective pilots and can
not be satisfied with expectations, since the value of each
combat pilot is not measured in exhibitions in peace time
but during actual fighting in the war. The full abilities of
each combat pilot may be shown only in victory through
actual air combat.
In the Israeli-Syrian experience, although there
were many combat pilots, each with his special pride, every
pilot could not be an Ace, and at worst case, might become a
statistic in the opposite side Ace's kill record. For
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example, Syrian pilots who had suffered humiliation through
the past wars had been considered, generally, as lower
quality pilots. But, there were few Syrian pilots who tried
to avoid combat, and they showed perseverance and confidence
in the past Middle East wars despite their lower level of
the combat capability [ Ref . 3: p. 233]. They might have
even expected victory and the possibility of becoming an ace
in confrontations with Israeli aircraft, but the results
were to the contrary. In a word, they were not the combat
effective pilots they expected to be.
In conclusion, there is a clear difference in
quality among pilots. One can not say the pilot's pride or
confidence will decide the pilot's performance directly,
though it can be an important factor in the air battle.
Instead, we should realize that some combat effective pilots
exist among pilots, and some other pilots, average pilots
and even non-combat effective pilots exist, as well, while
nonetheless, most combat pilots consider themselves as
potential Aces.
Let us consider the performance of effective combat
pilots.
2. Historical Pilot Combat Effectiveness
Although each pilot wants to be a combat effective
pilot, only a small percentage of pilots have been effective
in past wars. The performance of this limited group is
valuable to observ in terms of the expectations of this
research for the combat effective pilot's selection, and
training.
According to the official Eight Air Force records of
5,000 fighter pilots, only 261 (i.e., 5.2 percent) became
Aces in the war against the Germans during 1943-1945. This
small group of pilots, however, accounted for 40 percent of
the total 5284. 5 German planes destroyed by the Eighth Air
Force fighter pilots. Thus, five percent claimed forty
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percent of the kill. As an another example, USAF combat
Super Sabre pilots destroyed 792 MIG-15 fighters while
losing 78 F-86 Super Sabres in the Korean War (1950-1953).
One can get a similar figure with the performance of the
Eight Air Force Aces. We consider that a fair chance for a
kill is a function of sufficient encounters and many pilots
do not have ample opportunity to demonstrate their skill
because of the characteristics of a limited modern air
battle. Of the 800 USAF F-86 pilots, each of whom had at
least 25 counter air missions (presumably, a fair chance for
a kill), only 4.8 percent became Aces, but they accounted
for over 38 percent of the total kills [ Ref . 14: p. 3-8].
One can see that victory of the air battle has
depended upon a small group of pilots, so called combat
effective pilots. History has frequently been made by a
small elite group, not by all people. The results of this
analysis prompt us to seek the combat effective pilot as a
means of maintaining the greatest capability for conducting
an air battle.
If we select and train combat effective pilots, we
can expect a higher performance and higher rate of
survivability. The organization of Israel's special air
combat 'Hunter' squadron, which includes their most skillful
and experienced pilots, may be based on the result of this
kind of analysis. The IAF sends pilots of the 'Hunter'
squadron as the first wave when hostilities break out, an
operating procedure which may, in addition to the
superiority of general combat pilots, aircraft, and other
systems [Ref. 15: p. 287], help account for the IAF's
unbelievable kill ratio. In the Yom-Kippur War (1973), the
Egyptian Air Force exercised their Air defense system
successfully, shooting down many Israeli planes in the first
few days of the war. At the time, they were quite satisfied
with their achievement since they apparently eliminated some
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of Israel's best pilots in addition to the actual number of
aircraft downed. Although the Egyptians were unable to
achieve victory in later air battles because of their
continuing relative quality inferiority vis-a-vis the
Israelis, one might see how the presence of the IAF's
'Hunter' squadron was recognized and appreciated by the
Egyptians.
3. Background Studies
A study of the performance of combat effective
pilots was conducted by H. Weiss in 1966. Weiss developed a
model to estimate the impact of being able to send only
"hawks" (i.e., combat effective pilot; potential Aces) to
battle. Several assumptions were made - pilots can be
categorized as either Hawks or Doves; Hawks, not identifi-
able before combat, represent ten percent of replacement
pilots; Hawks always win against Doves, Hawks are equiva-
lent, and no loss results from combat between Doves;
aircraft and pilots are replaced as they are lost and forces
are equal; and pilots can survive aircraft losses with a
certain specified probability; Air combat engagements are
one-on-one; the probability of having Hawks, Doves, or both,
in each combat engagement is proportional to their represen-
tation in the two forces. Based upon these assumptions,
Weiss concluded [ Ref . 16]:
If the precombat training and screening process delivers
only Hawks to one side, that side may have a 10:1
sustained exchange ratio, at all times.
Another study of pilot performance was performed by
the McDonnell research team in 1977. They obtained perform-
ance data on 12 pilots simulating flying a fighter type
aircraft using the most recent on-line gun and missile





RELATIVE PERFORMANCE BY KILL/LOSS RANKING
"pilot" "averagE kills averagE Eoiiis
A 3.5 0.
B 3.5 0.5










From Table VIII, one can say two of twelve pilots are
clearly superior, and four of twelve are poor risks. Based
on this simple simulation exercise, about 18 % of the pilot
population could be selected as superior in Air Combat
Maneuvering (ACM) and 25 % as inferior. A comparison of
pilot A and K' s performance can give us an indication why
one should try to secure combat effective pilots [ Ref . 14:
p. 6-17] . Although, one can think of many other relevant
compensate factors (e.g., flying hours, experience, weapon
systems, aircraft type experience), for some inferior pilots
nothing would compensate adequately.
From the Weiss and McDonnell studies, one can
conclude that the victory of an Air battle will depend on
whether we can secure combat effective pilots. With a high
percentage of air combat effective pilots, a country should
enjoy a high probability of winning. It would seem, then,
that it would be appropriate to identify those characteris-
tics which would aid in the selection of those individuals
with potential as combat effective pilots. The next section
will address the relevant pilot factors contributing to air
combat effectiveness.
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B. ANALYSIS OF AN AIR COMBAT EFFECTIVENESS
1. Combat Effectiveness Criteria
Establishing air combat effectiveness criteria is
the first step in evaluating air combat effectiveness.
Although analysis of air combat effectiveness has been
limited by the different environments in past engagements,
this study will propose a basis for assessment or identifi-
cation of the individual characteristics and critical skills
which, are thought to characterize a combat effective pilot.
Normally, the number of air kills is used as an
aggregate measure of air combat effectiveness, and the most
relevant data consists of those numbers. Air kill data,
however, does not completely represent the level of air
combat effectiveness since there are many other objective
and subjective criteria of combat effectiveness.
Furthermore, air kill data may be changed significantly if
we consider together opportunity and the number of times
shot down. For example, Erich Hartman, Germany's top ace
with 352 air kills during World War Two, was cited as a
model of air combat effectiveness. But, if one consider all
of the facts, there was a tremendous opportunity for kills
on the Russian front and he himself was forced down 18
times; roughly a 20: 1 modified kill ratio, such that one may
not have confidence in the total kill number [ Ref . 14: p.
3-9]
. This indicates more sophisticated models of air
combat effectiveness are required.
Criteria relating to training should also be consid-
ered. Because training criteria have been more readily
available, they have frequently been used for the selection
of combat effective pilot. Such criteria, however, tend to
select for training success, not for air combat effective-
ness [Ref. 17: p. 5]. So, we must be careful in assuming
that those who do well in training will necessarily go on to
do well in a combat situation. While training criteria are
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valid in predicting pass/fail in the pilot training program,
they do not necessarily measure those qualities required for
success in combat. A significant difference between combat
effective pilots and average pilots (even non-combat effec-
tive pilots) might manifest itself only in the air combat
situation.
A comprehensive study of air combat effectiveness
was conducted by the McDonnell research team in 1977. The
team identified thirty nine distinct criteria of air combat
effectiveness. The .thirty nine criteria identified had been
the subject of various previous researchers with resultant
conclusion concerning their effect. The list was divided
into two categories, objective and subjective measures.
Objective measures of fighter pilot combat effectiveness
include the number of air kills, combat mission, enemy sight
per combat mission, combat flying time, retention in the
fighter pilot program, ... etc. Subjective measures include
ratings by superiors, peers, and psychologists [ Ref . 14: p.
3-17]
. These criteria provide the list for investigation in
this thesis.
2. Predictor Variables for an Air Combat Effectiveness
The predictor variables related to combat effective-
ness criteria are likely to be performance measures on test
of various kinds, e.g.
,
personality, decision making, reac-
tion to stress, biographical variables, motor skills, apti-
tude, etc.
If one is able to identify a correlation between
these predictors and combat effectiveness criteria, it will
be possible to identify the best potential combat effective
pilot through assessing the relevant factors. However, it is
not easy in reality to assess all relevant predictors
because of only partial relations of factors to criteria, as
shown in the McDonnell team's report. According to the
McDonnell team's analysis, there are 51 factors which
34
comprise a profile of the combat effective pilot, and 45
factors among them are recommended to test for the selection
of substantial combat effective pilots. However, we can see
from the Appendix B that the USAF in practise applies only
10 factors to their selection procedure [ Ref . 14: p. 4-13].
We may determine which predictors are most signifi-
cant to air combat effectiveness based on combat pilots
relevances by reviewing some representative assertions. We
can expect an acceptable result by assessing only some crit-
ical predictors which could be identified in our research to
secure the best substantial air combat effective pilots.
A special study for prediction of a combat profi-
ciency was conducted by Lepley (1947).
Pilot were rated on,
(1) alertness (5) conscientiousness
(2) personality (6) air discipline and team work
(3) eagerness (7) flying proficiency
(4) dependability (8) compatibility
by a special rating procedure. The product-moment correla-
tions between ratings of pilots at the end of four months of
training and ratings of the combat proficiency made by
flight leaders after 9 to 16 combat missions yielded a
correlation coefficient of 0. 62. It indicates a better than
random prediction (0.5) of air combat effectiveness
[Ref. 19].
Straw Bridge and Kahn pointed out that flying
experience, life history factors of parental control and
striving, were most highly correlated with the indices of
air combat effectiveness, while aggressiveness, risk taking,
general information, flying hours had the highest correla-
tions with the air kills data [Ref. 20].
Jenkins ( 1950) did a factor analysis on data of Navy
pilots to identify characteristics of the "high group" of
combat pilots.
Eight characteristics identified by Jenkins were,
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(5) skill and interest in flying,
(6) seriousness and conscientiousness,
(7) coolness and steadiness,
(8) easygoing sociability.
The order of the above listings indicate the rank ordering
assigned by Navy pilots queried [ Ref . 21].
Torrence (1957) identified five factors that differ-
entiated between aces and nonaces. According to his asser-
tion, aces tended to
(1) exhibit fewer childhood neurotic behaviors,
(2) achieve better social adjustment,
(3) participate in a larger number of every day
activities involving risk and strategy,
(4) test the limits of behavior as boys,
(5) receive more early independence training.
He pointed out that aces have greater motivation as indi-
cated in interview data; this was evidenced by more attempts
on the part of aces to become fighter pilots and overt
efforts to obtain additional combat duty [Ref. 22].
Stanley (1973) suggested 10 significant factors in





(3) decision making capacity
(4) determination/fixation
(5) stress capacity
(6) lack of preparation
(7) excessive concern with self image






He emphasized the first five factors as the categories most
likely to distinguish between effective pilots and ineffec-
tive pilots [ Ref . 17: p. 25].
Aside from these assertions, Trumbull and Backstrol
showed the importance to combat success of a strong prefer-
ence to be fliers, and the weapon system evaluation group
(WSEG) suggested that combat experience is a more important
variable than flying experience in air-to-air combat success
[Ref. 14: p. 3-30].
3. Conclusion and Israeli Air Force Policy
Although many " researchers emphasized some relevant
predictor variables for air combat effectiveness, it can be
condensed into two main domains, individual characteristics
and special air combat skills. According to the McDonnell
research team's report, the importance of psychological
traits was confirmed by statistical data and it was consid-
ered to be a direct bearing on a pilot's combat effective-
ness [Ref. 14: p. 3-20].
Psychological testing plays an integral part in the
Israeli's pilot selection and evaluation. This emphasis is
borne out by the composition of the initial rating base for
selection of pilot candidates (Table IX).
TABLE IX
IAF'S INITIAL EVALUATION RATING BASE
"ITEMS™ PERCENTAGE
1. Candidates' personality 40 %
2. Perceptual/Motor test 30 %
3. Background variables 30 %
* Source: 'Canopy Over Israel' by Norman H. Gray
SEP 1978.
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Following this initial evaluation, recruits are sent to a 10
day selection and screening camp with a new group of behav-
ioral scientists and pilot/instructors to assess the candi-
dates' motivation, ability to innovate, aggressive traits,
leadership, and other traits as observed through their
activities. The IAF's selection and training pipeline is
detailed in Appendix C.
The IAF takes every necessary step in assuring that
the best are selected. This will preclude expending
resources on training of pilots who will fail at the end of
the 20 month training period or would not ultimately be a
combat effective pilot. In essence, the IAF believes that a
combat pilot's personality may be more important than his
individual flying skills.
The following are the 12 factors which the Israelis identify
as predictors of potential pilot combat effectiveness













It is difficult to determine exactly what IAF policy
One can see, however, they emphasis on psychological
traits for pilot selection and evaluation. This agrees with
various studies, since most researchers have pointed out the















(psychological traits) and a pilot's air combat effective-
ness. The result of these various studies is consistent
with current IAF policy.
The influence of special air combat skills might be
considered of secondary importance in terms of the overall
predict ability concerning an air combat effective pilot,
though it is a final direct factor of victory in an air
combat.
One may conclude that psychological traits and
combat skill will determine the air combat effective pilots
and they will decide the level of air combat effectiveness.
This conclusion has been supported by the IAF's overwhelming
victory records.
C. THE PROFILE OF AN AIR COMBAT EFFECTIVE PILOT
1. Tj£0. Main Characteristics of £ Combat Effective Pilot
According to Mark Heller, pilot selection and promo-
tion in Syria are influenced by communitarian and party
considerations [ Ref . 3: p. 234]. This Syrian policy may
presume that the pilot devoted to the party is a combat
effective pilot. However, there was no correlation between
the party affiliation and air combat effectiveness, even
discounting their miserable air combat record. In like
manner, the lion-hearted bravura, like that of the Kamikaze
pilot in World War Two, is not a sole contributing factor
for a pilot's air combat effectiveness.
A profile of a combat effective pilot can be derived
by viewing the individual characteristics and critical
combat skills of an air combat effective pilot as discussed
in section 2. The individual characteristics will be consid-
ered a more significant factor to the profile.
a. Personal Characteristics of an Air Combat
Effective Pilot
Two research studies, McDonnell's and Stanley's,
propose some ideas which can determine the relative impor-
tance of each item among the individual characteristics.
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The McDonnell research team identified 12
personal characteristics which are significant to the combat
effective pilot, as determined by interviews and the perti-
nent literature. The KAF pilots' opinion concerning these
items are listed in Table X.
TABLE X
PILOT OPINION OF IMPORTANCE OF SELECTED CHARACTERISTICS












46. 4 5i 41.7 % 7. 9 % 3. 2 % 0.9 %
Determination 41. 9 44. 6 12. 6 0. 9 0.
Desire to
achieve
43. 3 41.3 12. 4 2. 4 0. 6
Initiative 33. 3 47. 3 15. 8 3. 0. 6
courage 32. 6 40. 9 19. 7 5. 1. 8
Willingness to
take risk
33. 4 35. 8 17. 3 11. 7 1. 8
psychological
stress toler'
27. 5 39. 5 25. 1 6. 1. 8
physiological
stress toler
21. 1 37. 1 30. 3 10. 1 1. 5
Anxiety
tolerance
22. 2 35. 28. 1 13. 2 1. 5
Team cooper-
ativeness
17. 5 40. 1 30. 6 9. 8 2. 1
Endurance 14. 8 42. 3 31. 4 9. 5 2. 1
Leadership 16. 7 35. 2 34. 10. 5 3. 7
Approximately 85 percent of the pilots answering this ques-
tionnaire rated 'desired to achieve' , 'aggressiveness', and
'determination' as being critical or very important personal
characteristics. The factors of 'courage', 'initiative', and
'willingness to take risk' were rated critical or very
important by approximately 70-75 percent of the pilots
[Ref. 14: p. 3-104].
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Through interviews with 30 combat experienced
pilots, Stanley defined 8 categories of behavior which char-
acterized combat effective pilots and 9 categories which
characterized ineffective pilots. He combined these catego-
ries and rated them (Table XI).
TABLE XI
RANK ORDERING OF CHARACTERISTIC RATING TOTALS
Categories
( Ratings )
Effective ineffective Total Rank
Situation awareness 85. 5 76. 7 162. 2 1









































Communication 19. 4 — — 19. 4 10
* Rating = (% of total) x (% unanimous) x 1000
He discovered that combat performance may be assessed by
evaluating relatively few aspects of an individual's behav-
iors, and he emphasized the five categories with highest
total ratings as predictors for an air combat effective
pilot.
Since these two studies have been linked by
statistical data, characteristics from them can be used in
our model to select the air combat effective pilot, based on
the relative weight of each item. Because it was obtained
from more reliable sources; the literature, narrative
comments by actual aces, and questionnaire responses from
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373 fighter pilots [ Ref . 14: p. 3-105], the McDonnell
research team's data will be used to consider the predicted
effectiveness of NPS Korean pilots' effectiveness,
b. Special Air Combat Skills.
Some other factors besides the personal charac-
teristics have high correlations with air combat effective-
ness. In particular, flying time, age, and military career
have a significant correlation with air kill data and can be
included in the characteristics of an air combat effective
pilot. However, these factors have little value as a selec-
tion factor for combat effective pilots since the pilot only
attains these characteristics after his pilot training
program.
Some combat pilot skills may serve as predictor
variables in the selection process, particularly for general
pilots selecting for combat training.
The McDonnell research team identified nine
critical skills and abiliti-es through their literature and
pilot interviews. They rated the results of pilots' opinion
about the relative importance of those 9 factors concerning
flying, perceptual, and judgemental skills (Table XII).
The most surprising result of this set of ratings was the
fact that 'obtaining early visual target acquisition', not a
flying skill, appeared to be the most critical factor of
achieving combat effectiveness [Ref. 14: p. 3-105].
While these skills and abilities are important
in determining the combat effective pilot, they are not as
important as the personal characteristics addressed earlier.
2. Conclusion
A comprehensive description of the combat effective
pilot is provided by G. Gurney (1961) [Ref. 18].
The ace flew aggressively and always pressed his
attack. He was not necessarily reckless nor foolhardy,
but he was daring and a fighter. He loved to fly and
knew his business when he had the flying machine
strapped on by the safety belt. He was constantly on the
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TABLE XII




1. Obtain early visual target acquisition.
2. Perceive/judge target direction and rate
of turn, aspect angle, angle off, TCA,
range, closing rate, track crossing rate.
3.
4.
Keep track of critical flight parameters
(speed, alt , att , angle of attack, G
Select and executive the best maneuver to
gain a firing position ( yo yo, B/roll. . . etc)
5. Judge when to shoot.
6. Shoot well (both tracking, or raking shot
when tracking was impossible).
7. Handle the throttle (s) and speed brake
( manage energy )
.
8. Keep track of the other a/c - wing man,
hostiles.





* The higher the rating value the more important the skill.
A zero rating means it was not selected as in the top
five by over one-half of the pilots responding.
alert for the enemy and his experienced eyes were able
to catch that flicker of motion, that flashing speck on
the horizon, that almost unseen movement that was some-
times the only indication that an enemy was sharing the
same sky. In some cases, aces have been able to run up
an impressive number of victories because of their
exceptional shooting abilities, but while this ability
often made a difference in final totals, it seldom alone
made a flyer an ace. The ace understood his business,
learned from his own experience and from that of others,
carefully employing these tactics which put to greatest
advantage his fighting vehicle. With this combination of
fighting attributes the ace seized the advantage to
sweep the enemy before him.
In summary, one can say the combat effective pilot
should have psychological and physical fitness, preference
and pride for flying, special combat skill, combat experi-
ence, and knowledge about the mission and job. The greatest
43
likelihood of producing a combat effective pilot is through
selection based on all of these relevant factors. However,
in reality, it is impossible to apply all relevant factors
( assessed or not assessed) to pilot selection and the evalu-
ation, as mentioned before. It is, therefore, more appro-
priate to consider some critical predictors for selection,
such as those individual characteristics pointed out by
Stanley [ Ref . 17: p. 25], than trying to consider all rele-
vant factors.
The next chapter will analyze KAF combat pilots'
self-report data against the personal characteristics and
special combat skills from the McDonnell research team
report.
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IV. AN ANALYSIS OF THE PERSONAL CHARACTERISTICS
ANT) COMSAT SKTrL^^F^O^EATTFTGHTER PILOTS
A. ANALYSIS OF NPS KOREAN PILOTS DATA
1. Methodology
The best way to analyze particular phenomena is
through observational data of the actual event or activity.
However, time, economic, and spatial constraints preclude
the gathering of such data in many cases, and necessitate
the study of some surrogate activity.
Accordingly, it would be preferable to have actual
KAF air combat data for analysis and generation of a model
of air combat effectiveness. Such a model would be more
comprehensive as it would capture specific data not avail-
able for a generalized model. However, historical reality
has determined that there is no actual combat experience
among current KAF pilots and consequently no combat data. As
a surrogate, we will use KAF fighter pilot self-report data
as structured by previous studies. The combat effectiveness
of KAF pilots will be generalized from our literature review
which provides insight regarding the model of air combat
effectiveness.
Although there are many ways to assess a specific
traits (e.g., paper and pencil tests, perceptual-motor skill
tests), it is better to assess all relevant factors
together. The micro-computer based LOTUS 1.2.3 5 electronic
spreadsheet program proves to be an excellent means for this
purpose, although it was designed for use in many diverse
general applications.
5
"LOTUS 1.2.3 is a desk top computer programs. It
combines the advanced electronic worksheet yet developed
with graphics and a information management capacity
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The relevant factors in determining a combat effec-
tive pilot were addressed in Chapter III. The McDonnell
research team's survey data resulting from the most compre-
hensive study is used for the analysis. The 'LOTUS 1.2.3'
model assesses KAF pilot self-report data related to both
critical factor areas, pilot's personalities and combat
skills, which have been validated as main variables of a
combat effective pilot by McDonnell team.
The model will identify the predicted most combat
effective pilot as well as determine which factors are the
most significant to the KAF case.
2. Survey Data and Relative Weights
a. Survey Data
The surveyed Korean Air Force pilots at the
Naval Post Graduate school were selected to attend by a set
of selection criteria (English test score, academic grades,
general evaluation grades, etc). The selected 12 pilots had
more 1000 hours fighter flying time each and more than 5
years in a tactical fighter squadron which was considered
enough experience to make them credible respondents.
Although suspicion might arise about the objec-
tivity of a pilot's response, the data is considered unbi-
ased and suitable for the demonstration since they knew it
would not have any influence or effect on their career or
school performance, as well as the fact that it was an anon-
ymous survey (Appendix D).
b. Relative Weights
Although many researchers have pointed out the
importance of personalities over combat skills and that the
IAF has applied the study results to their selection/
evaluation system, we will assume an equal weight between
personalities and combat skills in our model because there
is no way to judge a relative weight between them.
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The relative weight for the personal character-
istic factors can be assigned through the results of the
McDonnell study. From table X, the left column indicates
the percentage of pilots who think a factor is critical, and
we will weight those items by "each item's percentage/sum
of the total items' percentage".
Table XII shows the 9 combat skills which were
identified by the McDonnell research team, and we will use
the top 5 skills among those relevant factors since those 5
items were rated with non-zero median ratings. But, one can
not put a relative weight on the items since non-zero median
ratings do not directly represent a value of relative
weight. ratings were included in the 9 total items).
Therefore, we will apply equal weights to the top 5 items in
our model, simply to demonstrate the results.
3. Result
The result of the LOTUS model, the 12 sample pilots'
relative ratings as air combat effective pilots, appear in
Appendix E", with the overall ratings shown in Figure 4. 1 for
demonstration.
We can say from the Figure 4. 1 that pilot 2 is the most
effective pilot and pilot 5 is the least effective pilot
based on the two general factor groupings. Such results can
be used to identify the potentially combat effective pilot
among the pilot candidates or general combat pilots.
Besides the overall ratings of NPS Korean pilots'
psychological characteristics and special combat skills, we
can obtain more specific data of each grouping. Results may
supply valuable information impacting on the future policy
of pilot management of the KAF. For example, the average
weighted ratings of the NPS Korean pilots' psychological
characteristics highlights a lack of 'aggressiveness' and
'willingness to take a risk' (Figure 4.2). The NPS Korean
pilots' characteristics might be due to their special
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Figure 4. 1 Overall Rating of NPS Korean Combat Pilots.
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personalities since they were selected to study voluntarily,
or due to a KAF's basic flying philosophy: Safety is
Paramount. Regardless of its exact reason, the important
thing to note is that some fighter pilot may be identified
as having a weakness in a particular characteristic area
with its resultant impact on the individual's air combat
effectiveness. Presumably, something could be done to
strengthen the weakness to the improvement of combat
effectiveness.
Based on the analysis of results of the LOTUS model,
we may assess all common pilots and pilot candidates objec-
tively and effectively, and it will be used as a direct
reference for a combat effective pilot management. Finally,
KAF should focus on this kind of data analysis; overall
ratings, each pilot and each specific item, and average
group analysis to secure more substantial combat effective
pilots and manage them scientifically for the increased air
combat readiness.
4. Recommendation for an Actual Application
There is a no doubt that 'LOTUS 1.2.3' model has a
powerful function to assess all relevant factors together.
But, that point is not so important since our goal is a
selection of combat effective pilots and an improvement of
air combat effectiveness as a result of it, not finding a
powerful executive model itself.
The result of LOTUS model will be influenced by the
specific test data and relative weights assigned to the
factors. The result in Figure 4. 1 would change signifi-
cantly if actual air combat input data and calculated
weights are used instead of subjective survey data with
assumed relative weights. The evaluation of each pilot's
characteristics, skills and relative weights should be
performed first in order to obtain meaningful ratings among
the candidates or general pilots being assessed for combat
effectiveness potential.
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Figure 4. 2 The Average Weighted Rating of
Psychological Characteristics.
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The application of the Air Combat Maneuvering
Range/Instrument (ACMR/I) system may help refine the task by
being able to more closely simulate air combat data from
which it is possible to determine correlations between rele-
vant factors and air combat activities. Although it is not
equivalent to actual combat data, the data of the ACMR/I
system is valuable in representing an air combat situation
in which it is possible to trace each maneuvering, aircraft
controlling, relative positions with target, and weapon
success, ...so on [ Ref . 14: p. 6-2]. Furthermore, the
ACMR/I system can simulate present air combat characteris-
tics and be modified in the future for future aircraft
advancement. ACMR/I data is able to be generated with
current aircraft and weapon systems, while past research
dealt with World War Two and Korean War scenarios. Data from
the current ACMR/I system of the KAF should be used for this
data analysis, as well as data from direct combat training.
If the ACMR/I and training evaluation systems are employed
effectively to determine correlations between relevant
factors and ACMR/I performance data, more reliable output
data from the model assessing all factors could be expected.
If longitudinal studies of KAF simulate and training
combat effectiveness were to begin as early as now, it would
take upwards of 5 years to track a pilot from candidate to
combat ready fighter pilot with 3 years experience. This
implies a long range study necessary to obtain sufficient
significant data for analysis. The effort would be worth
the cost, since once some critical factors related air
combat effectiveness and relative weights among them are
established through a simulated combat performance data
analysis (by ACMR/I, or other computer system), it can be
used to assess and select with greater confidence potential
air combat effective pilots from among pilot candidates and
general pilots.
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Expected benefits include a reduction in training
cost through a reduced wash-out rate and an enhanced air
combat capability through identification and selection of
more combat effective pilots, and should easily outweigh the
costs of research and program implementation. research cost
and endeavour absolutely.
B. IMPLICATION FOR PILOT QUALITY CONTROL
1. Securing the Best Pilot Candidates
In the discussion thus far, it is evident the level
of air combat readiness depends on securing and maintaining
a force of air combat effective pilots. The importance of
the combat pilot has increased due to more complex and
costly aircraft and systems, and the increasing complexity
of warfare. Combat effective pilots are of primary impor-
tance in the attainment of air combat readiness, and combat
pilot quality related directly to the quality of pilot
candidates.
It has long been apparent that, in general, top
quality pilots began as top quality candidates and
conversely a lesser quality candidate could be expected to
become a lesser quality pilot. This echos a Biblical passage
that a good tree will produce a good fruit.
Regardless of the numbers of pilots introduced into
the force, if good quality individuals are selected a
certain number of good pilots should result. Many countries,
however, seem to deal in number only, accessing the number
of pilots necessary to fill a combat squadron's requirement
and provide for replacement of detachers and attritors. If
an Air Force can not or chooses not to induce higher quality
candidates to be a pilot, it is hard to secure combat effec-
tive pilots regardless of how good its selection/evaluation
system.
Selection of good quality individuals is possible
when the most high-school graduates are motivated to enter
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pilot training. That motivation may take the form of some-
thing such as the cares of operating a $26,000,000 state-of-
the-art aircraft. It is not incidental that the IAF has
been able to maintain a high state combat readiness and the
fact that to be a pilot in the IAF is the ultimate ambition
for most young male Israelis.
Because of the combat pilot's critical value to the
KAF and the country, promoting high- school graduate interest
in being a pilot should be a national concern and not just
that of the Air Force. As a consequence of Israeli universal
military service, pilots can be carefully selected, despite
the small total population base. Israel acknowledges the
view that the stature of the IAF fighter pilot is high in
the eyes of the Israeli people, and the pilots receive
exceptional consideration in matters of selection, training,
and treatment [ Ref . 5: p. 15].
In a word, one should secure more qualified
resources for the selection of a more combat effective pilot
in order to improve air combat readiness. Motivation for
voluntary application might be provided by mass media adver-
tising and recruiter activity in a short term, and by
improving the treatment 6 of the pilot in the long term.
Certainly there are trade offs. But it would be
better to invest the cost of one aircraft to help secure
higher quality pilots than to have one additional aircraft
with a mediocre pilot. The lessons of past air battles tell
us that to fight an air battle with mediocre pilots does not
mean one or two aircraft lost, but rather 50, 100, or
hundreds aircraft.
6When a pilot attain the rank be Major in the IAF, he is
Srovided housing, and half the cost of a car. As a LCOL,
ousing, a car, gasoline, and utilities are the rewards.
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2. Assessing Pilot Candidates
Presuming the accession of a sufficient quantity of
high quality pilot candidates, the next step is the
screening of candidates for those qualities that make a
combat effective pilot.
The current assessment system for the KAF pilot
candidates i. e. , Academy cadets, based on the entrance exam-
ination score for the KAF Academy, is insufficient for our
purposes. Although KAF uses a pilot aptitude test and
interview for these candidates, besides an entrance examina-
tion, there is a considerable need for improvement since the
results of the aptitude test and interview have been used as
secondary means of candidate selection. Furthermore, if
candidate camouflages himself intentionally to pass the
entrance barrier, valid assessment is difficult under the
current system since most results are assessed by the cadet
discipline officer and other instructors, not by selection
experts.
This failure to employ selection experts is the big
difference between KAF and IAF selection/evaluation systems.
The IAF considers the candidates' psychological characteris-
tics and other pilot test (aptitude, psychomotor, and cogni-
tive) data more important than intellectual comparisons.
Their evaluations emphasize psychological assessment of
pilot candidates by the special psychologists and pilot
instructors based on the average I. Q. candidate (Appendix
C).
Similar selection criteria can be discovered in the
Canadian Air Force. Their current test battery for the pilot
candidates consists of a psychomotor test, a pencil and
paper test which addresses verbal and quantitative apti-
tudes, a memory test, a measure of cognitive style, the
Group Embedded Figures test and selected scales from
Jackson's personality research form [ Ref . 23: p. 701].
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In order to stay at the leading edge in selection,
the KAF needs to change its emphasis in the pilot candidate
assessment system from intellectual measures to the psycho-
logical factors and other relevant testing if it desires
optimum selection for combat effective pilots. The psycho-
logical factors and pilot aptitude test data should be exam-
ined carefully because this data reflects the candidates'
mental attitude which is considered more critical than
actual combat skills. Aside from the importance of psycho-
logical factors, the significance of pilot aptitude can be
seen from the results of Royal Air Force (RAF) research. The
relationship between a pilot aptitude test data and RAF
Flying Selection Squadron 7 grades is shown in Figure 4. 3.
High correlations are evident in the figure shape and rejec-
tion distribution [ Ref . 24: p. 716].
Of course, other pilot-relevant tests such as
psychomotor and cognitive tests can be used to assess pilot
candidates, specifically in terms of their potential for
flying [Ref. 25: p. 125]. Accordingly, it is a matter of
priority that the pilot candidate assessment program at the
KAF Academy be conducted by experts (psychologist/pilot
instructors/data analyst) specializing in this area. The
assessment program at the KAF Academy should be the main
focus for improvement, because the combat effective pilot
will be selected from among this group.
This strengthening of the assessment program can be
facilitated through the use of a computer model like as
'LOTUS 1.2.3' to assist in assessing all relevant factors
and evaluation of each candidate. Such computer aids will
assist in the analysis of pilot candidate selection and
training.
7 this squadron was made for the prediction of success in
later flying training, and its activity was evidenced by
high correlations between their grades and success/failure


















































Large differences were evidenced among the personal
characteristics and combat skills of the NPS Korean pilots
surveyed. The existance of these differences supports the
necessity of specialized targeted training to strengthen
deficiencies and, ultimately, to improve the total quality
level of the pilot corps.
Training some pilots to be combat effective will
enhance most of pilot quality control effect unless we can
find a way to secure perfect pilots directly. In our search
for perfect pilot the following discussion will focus on
training to support the factor of personal characteristics
and combat skills which are essential to air combat
effectiveness.
a. Specialized Training in Combat Skills
It would be of great benefit to the attainment
of combat effectiveness if deficient combat skills, skills
essential to success, could be strengthened through special
training. Fortunately, it appears that air combat skills can
be taught. The definitive evidence of the positive effect
of specialized training for an air combat effective pilot
comes from Navy pilots' kill ratio in Vietnam War. Prior to
the introduction of the Navy's Top Gun School where pilots
fly against dissimilar aggressor aircraft, the kill ratio
was 2.5: 1 ; after Top Gun training the kill ratio jumped
to 12. 5 : 1 . While this improvement may be due to selection
practices of sending only the "better" pilots to Top Gun
School, or just due to luck, it is usually seen as an
evidence of the effect of a combat specialized training
[ Ref . 26]. This result may be explained also by Weiss
assertion which emphasized the significance of a surviv-
ability in first some decisive encounters. According to his
assertion, those pilots who survive their first 5-8 decisive
encounters then evidence a high probability (about .98) of
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surviving subsequent decisive encounters [ Ref . 14: p. 3-9].
Having experienced their first encounters in training they
are able to gain the survivability edge in a not life-
threatening environment.
Comparison data in Table XIII provides a limited
but contemporary indication of the value of specialized
pilot's training.
TABLE XIII
USAF-USANG SHOOTING COMPETITION DATA
Event
1. Average shooting score
- MDB( angle 30) : CEA
- LADB( angle 15) : CEA
- GUNNERY : Strafe Percentage
2. Individual overall winners in their respective events
< F-100 Vs A-7 > < F-100 Vs F-4 >
- Top strafe : ANG - Top strafe : ANG
- Top LADB : USAF
- Top MDB : ANG
Re su It
< USAF > < ANG >
44 ft 34 ft
43 ft 44 ft
68 % 68 %
- Top LADB : ANG
- Top MDB : ANG
- Top Gun : ANG - Top Gun ANG
(overall best pilot) (overall bes pilot)
* MDB - Medium Angle Dive Bomb
* LADB - Low Angle Dive Bomb
* CEA - Center of Effective Area
In a bombing competition, the results of 8 antiquated F-lOOs
of the US Air National Guard (ANG) vs 8 A-7s (one of the
most sophisticated bombing aircraft) of USAF and the results
of 4 F-lOOs of USANG vs 20 F-4s USAF were shown on Table
XIII. These statistics indicate that while the ANG pilots
fly older aircraft, they compensate for this deficiency by
their specialized training. They may remain in the same
units and flying the same mission for their entire career
[Ref. 13: p. 15].
58
This kind of specialized training has been
applied strongly in the Israeli Air Force. The pilots in all
combat squadrons of the IAF that are not in the Operational
Training Unit (OTU) program fly the same schedule each day
for a 4-month training cycle. On all missions during the
basic training phase in the OTU program, Air-to-Air,
Air-to-Ground, Formation, and Night flying are mixed to
prepare the pilot for the unexpected. The IAF considers Air
Combat Maneuvering (ACM) proficiency to be the true test of
their pilots' airmanship. Accordingly, 80 % of training is
dedicated to Air-to-Air dog fighting - 20 % to Air-to-Ground
missions [ Ref . 5: p. 21].
The position of the USAF on the importance of
Air-to-Air training is similar to the IAF position, though
for a different reason. For example, F-4 wings are desig-
nated for either primary Air-to-Air or Air-to-Ground
missions. Some 65 % of training is supposed to be directed
to the primary mission, though, in the past, USAF training
for F-4 squadrons had been about evenly divided between
Air-to-Air and Air-to-Ground training. More recently,
however, the USAF is placing more emphasis on Air-to-Air
combat training out of consideration for the reduced
Air-to-Ground opportunities as a result of Soviet and Warsaw
Pact emphasis on shelters, dispersal, decoys, camouflage,
and intensive air defense networks. The increased number of
enemy aircraft saved on the ground will be seen in the air.
Former General Dixon who was a commander of the
USAF Tactical Air Command (TAC), acknowledged specialized
training as a key part USAF TAC modernization plans
[ Ref. 27: p. 30] : "Training specialized air crews provide a
maximum return on limited training resources".
Finally, the IAF feels that specialized pilot
training for the Air-to-Air mission will provide "air combat
experts" which will gain victory in the air. Pilots who have
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been trained specifically for Air-to-Air mission can convert
easily to other missions after earning their air superiority
credentials. It is essential that the KAF train more pilots
through a concentrated training program of specific combat
skills and experiences , such that actions taken in the
initial air combat will lead to victory.
Since the KAF is numerically inferior to the
North Korean Air Force and Seoul, the capital of Republic of
Korea, is too close to the De-Militarized Zone (DMZ), the
KAF must be able to marshall almost all aircraft for air
defence to protect Seoul and vicinity area in the event of
enemy attack. This anticipated scenario precludes, during
the initial stages of warfare, the allocation of air power
to other missions such as Air Defense, CAS, Interdiction,
and Air Offence. Consequently, a specialized Air-to-Air
training should be considered as a first priority for the
KAF because other missions are feasible only after victory
in the initial air combat.
Specialized training for each pilot can be more
effective if focused on specific skill weakness identified
during initial assessment of predictor skill factors.
ACMR/I is an excellent medium for identifying each pilot's
strengths and weakness in air combat maneuvering. The
results of subsequent analysis will help determine future
individual general or special training.
Specialized individual training focused on
success promoting skills is a resource draining enterprise.
To compensate for individual weakness not addressed through
training due to training resource constraints, it is
possible to magnify the individual strengths through the
synergism of group performance. The synergistic strength
could be the rationale behind the existance of special
combat squadrons, like the IAF Hunter squadron. There is a
multiplier effect of top quality pilots and specialized
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training programs. The KAF would benefit from establishing
some special combat squadrons to strengthen its specialized
air combat training program in expectation of greater combat
effectiveness. A selected air combat squadron could expect
a higher kill ratio, and would be sent first into battle
while other squadrons take another missions (CAS,
Interdiction, or CAP). If pilots are sent into combat
against an enemy with good fliers without adequate special-
ized Air-to-Air combat training, high attrition, poor combat
effectiveness, or both, could be anticipated [ Ref . 14: p.
1-10].
b. Psychological Training for Personal
Characteristics
Although most researchers and the IAF have
concluded that the psychological factors are more important
than the combat skills, the level of training to psycholog-
ical factors has not reached the level of combat skill
training. Because psychological training in military has
been considered synonymous with military discipline which
can be imparted by training instructors or discipline offi-
cers, it has not been developed in a meaningful way for air
combat effectiveness despite its implication for enhanced
effect. Psychological training for future pilots does not
imply solely a military discipline regimen, though it might
include that. The fact that the IAF employs special
psychologists and pilot instructors to select combat effec-
tive pilots suggests a special attention to the psycholog-
ical factors area.
No matter how well select pilot candidates
psychologically, there exist quality differences among the
groups and among each individuals. Appropriately, psycho-
logical training should be administered to supplement and
reinforce these characteristics in keeping with the concept
of human potential. The tour at the Air Force Academy could
be used for this training. While the IAF starts flight
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training just after a selection stage, 4 years of academic
life with special attention to developing Cadet psycholog-
ical characteristics should help the Cadets strengthen those
characteristics which have been shown to be positively
correlated with air combat effectiveness.
The current standards of Korean Air Force
Academy Cadet honor; to keep the rule well, good grades from
studying, and good peer/upper class ratings are not peculiar
to combat effective pilots, who require some unique personal
characteristics (Aggressiveness, Desire to achieve,
Determination, etc) compared with other military academies
cadets. It would seem appropriate that KAF Academy set up a
psychological training program designed to develop in each
cadet the optimal psychological profile for an effective
pilot. A special staff of expert psychologists and experi-
enced pilot instructors at the Air Force Academy would be
charged with selection of potentially combat effective
candidates, to determination of each cadet's strong/weak
points, development of individual/group training programs,
and progress monitoring.
Although the current KAF Academy program may
cover many parts of special psychological training, there is
a difference between systematic and casual training. The
temperament of the effective combat pilot is unique and a
systematic approach to developing that temperament is
essential.
The recognized importance of personal character-
istics for the combat effectiveness and the possibility of
training to human characteristics is fundamental to a




After the initial training of combat pilots, it is
important to effectively manage them for the highest combat
readiness. Disregard for the management of combat pilots is
equivalent to pouring water into a leaky jar. The impact on
the USAF of high attrition reveals the importance of pilot
management.
For force readiness a primary consideration in pilot
management is keeping pilots in a "cockpit only" status as
long as possible. However, there are many intervening
requirements which challenge the concept: Staff abilities,
Leadership experiences, Education level, and Individual
pilot's retention. Furthermore, we can not recklessly push
pilots to be "cockpit only" since the human being is not a
machine. Some accommodation must be made between the
requirement for "cockpit only" pilots and many other
competing requirements.
The IAF maintain their pilots in maximum "cockpit
only" status. When pilots are assigned to headquarters for
duty they must, and do, maintain their combat flying capa-
bility by returning to their squadron at its base twice a
week, and when assigned to be instructors, they must return
and fly with their operational squadrons once a week - and
for 1 week every 4 month. Although one may anticipate some
trouble performing in their current job (flying instruction/
headquarters duties) and even safety problems, the general
thinking of the IAF is that every pilot is a pilot first,
last, and always [ Ref . 5: p. 19]. According to the USAF
magazine, the estimated ratio of assigned pilots (20,781) to
aircraft (7,343) for FY '86 is about 2.8:1 [Ref. 28: pp.
190, 196], while the IAF's ratio is 2.4:1. But, if one
considers second line pilots' combat ready status, the rela-
tive ratios may be reversed. IAF policies appear to compen-
sate for numeric inferiority by maximum aircraft turn
arounds with sufficient pilots.
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The KAF that has a policy similar to that of the IAF
with regard to flight currency for second line pilots'
combat readiness. However, many second line pilots of the
KAF, except those on air bases, should not be sent to air
combat directly, since they fly trainer type aircraft with
instructors (not their original type fighter) for their
flight currency. Therefore, the current KAF policy may help
second line pilots to maintain a flying sense, but extra
requalification would be needed to use them in actual
combat. The pilots/time/aircraft required to requalify them
in wartime may not be available unless those assets are made
available through pre-hostility planning. In considering
the prevailing concept of modern war (total, lightning war),
the significance of "current available" pilots is apparent.
The KAF should consider a strengthened flight proficiency
maintenance policy with pilots assigned to their fighter
types.
A further consideration for pilot management is the
maintenance of the traditional atmosphere of a combat
squadron which allows pilots to concentrate on only things
of combat mission relevance; studying aircraft capability,
weapon systems employment, tactics, enemy identification,
mission assessment, etc. To this end, a current pilot's
load should be assessed with non-flight related requirements
(e.g., reports and administrative jobs) delegated as much as
possible to non-pilot officers.
In the Korean Air Force 'SAFETY' magazine, one pilot
detailed the tight daily schedule of a combat squadron;
unnecessary meetings and desk work, a heavy dispatch rate, a
deficiency of present pilots, and frequent alert duties,
obstacles to flying safety [ Ref . 29: p. 38] . All of these
things should be considered in terms of the combat pilot's
primary activities. If these are even critical to the flying
safety issue, one can imagine the lack of real air combat
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training. All concern might become absorbed with daily
routine schedules. It would be prudent to try to alleviate
the combat pilot's unnecessary loads and stresses by
accessing more pilots and support personnel. It would help
pilots to concentrate on combat related work; to prepare for
combat missions and to improve physical strength, at least
while they are working in a combat squadron. It may be a
good for the KAF to note that the IAF has limited its
conversion training to once a year per combat squadron,
normally for their typical combat mission, and they have
trained younger 8 pilots and assigned major missions to them
based on their combat abilities. [ Ref . 5: p. 20] .
In addition to the active atmosphere of a combat
squadron, it is important to maintain high morale amongst
the pilots throughout the combat squadron's life since most
KAF pilots will stay over 15 years in the Air Force. Unless
we change our purpose ( to secure air combat effective
pilots), Care should be taken to ensure that pilot morale is
not lowered by work loads in excess of air combat relevant
duties. In the USAF case, a dissatisfaction with alerts,
long crew duty days, and meaningless additional duties were
pointed out as a reason for pilot attrition, and the USAF
has had a serious pilot attrition problem due to these
reasons [Ref. 30]. Therefore, Korean Air Force should take
care to maintain the combat squadron tasked with only essen-
tial combat relevant duties in order to keep the pilots in a
high state of combat readiness.
Finally, for a high combat readiness with well-
trained combat pilots in Korean Air Force, we should try to
maintain the maximum number of combat available pilots by a
maximum 'cockpit only' policy and to seek an atmosphere in
the combat squadron which focuses pilot attention on combat
8 Average age of IAF pilot in combat squadron is 25, a
squadron commander is 30, and a wing commander is 37.
Canopy Over Israel , 1982.
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duties and maintenance of a high state of readiness. Since
the pilot retention issue of KAF is not so serious due to
the long obligation, the above considerations will be
valuable fundamentals of KAF pilot management in terms of
managing and maintaining the maximum available combat effec-
tive pilots.
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V. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION
The pilot combat effectiveness is as crucial to air
combat readiness as air combat readiness is to national
defense. The focus of this thesis has been the selection,
training, and management of the combat effective pilot
toward the maintenance of the KAF's maximum air combat
readiness.
The significance of an air power in Korea is more crit-
ical than most other countries. In that a prepared decisive
defense force is necessary to counter the high possibility
of surprise intensive attack by a North Korean force which
is within Air attack radius. A maximum air combat readiness
is mandatory to repulse an attack in its initial stages.
Unfortunately, the current efforts of the KAF to increase
the level of an air combat readiness is not in keeping with
its significance and North KAF's attack capability, despite
a continuous modernization policy by the KAF. Korean
research into analysis and development of air combat effec-
tiveness factors is primitive, since KAF has been able to
receive much information and data from the USAF. The
special nature of the KAF dictates embarking on the our own
research about the air combat effectiveness factors with KAF
data applied KAF pilot quality control. The psychological
characteristics data for the NPS sample pilots in Chapter IV
might provide initial indications of a place to start
improvement or specialized training efforts. The USAF's and
other countries' research may be less meaningful in the
different Korean social and military context. The magnitude
of the problem may also be different with the number of KAF
combat aircraft is over 500 (even though that number is
still inferior to North KAF), and a need for approximately
1000 combat effective pilots. The quality level of those
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KAF pilots will play a crucial role in national
survivability.
It is essential for maximum pilot combat effectiveness
that the KAF secure good pilot candidates, provide them more
physical and psychological training at the Air Force
Academy, employ specialized flight training, then keep them
on a maximum "cockpit only" status with emphasis on
Air-to-Air training and a traditional combat squadron's
atmosphere. In order to assist the selection and training
processes it is recommended that attention be paid to the
two main predictors domains for an air combat effective
pilot, psychological characteristics and special combat
Skills. These factors with positive correlation to pilot
effectiveness provide good guidance for pilot quality
control. The significance of psychological characteristics
is great since they have more influence than specific combat
skills on air combat effectiveness, evidenced by the results
of the McDonnell study [ Ref . 14: p. 3-20].
The selection of combat effective pilots based on these
criteria, should result in a higher victory probability as
they are sent to initial air combat and as the KAF is able
to maintain an increased level of air combat readiness.
Research on these issues is required with reference to KAF
pilot quality control using special research groups and
analysis equipment, like the ACMR/I system.
Of course, emphasizing the points brought out in thesis
concerning the achievement of maximum combat effectiveness,
does not imply that there are no other relevant factors or
intelligences. As Blankert's research in Chapter II indi-
cates [Ref. 10: p. 43] , we can expect the best results when
a good pilot is combined with other superior physical
systems (good weapon systems, aircraft, electronic warfare
systems, etc). The electronic warfare ability is becoming
more critical in an air combat as demonstrated in the 1986
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USA-Libya conflict [ Ref . 31: p. 17]. The USAF's "Ready
Pressure/High Flow G-suit' research 9 may have strong posi-
tive implications for KAF for air combat effectiveness. The
KAF should be vigilant to any and all potential positive
factors influencing air combat effectiveness.
Finally, the KAF, as a first priority, critically needs
and relies on combat effective pilots for the maximum air
combat readiness in support of national defense power. To
promote air combat effectiveness the KAF should establish a
special research group whose efforts would enhance KAF pilot
quality control at all stages in the combat pilot career
pipeline. An emphasis on research activity by the KAF will
guarantee a more decisive role of the KAF in wartime as
manifested by an increased air combat effectiveness.
9 USAF has been developing a ready pressure/ high flow
G-suit that anticipates a nigh G maneuver and inflates
before instead of during the turn or bank (this allows the
pilot to withstand the higher force). Air Force, Jan 1986.
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APPENDIX A.
THE CURRENT STATUS OF USAF
< ITEMS > <FY'82> <FY'83> <FY'84> <FY'85> <FY'86>
1. AF Military
. Officers 102,000 104,600 106,200 108,200 109,600











2. AF Budget Outlays
. Current Dollars $55,104 $62,894 $68,620 $83,435 *94,011
. Constant FY' 86
Dollars
$64,126 $70,178 $74,089 $86,868 $94,011(millions of dollars)
. AF percent of:
GNP 1.8% 2.0% 1.9% 2.2% 2.2%
DOD Budget 30. 1% 30.7% 31.1% 33.9% 33.9%
3. Type of Aircraft
. Tanker 542 546 556 561 573
. Fighter/Attack/
Interceptor 2,900 2,997 3,019 3,048 3,037
. Recon' /Electroni
Warfare 363 385 404 424 425











Figure A. 1 USAF Expansion Status.
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APPENDIX S
PREDICTORS OF A COMBAT EFFECTIVE PILOT
Characteristics Not Recommended Tested Not Tested
& Critical Skills for Testing by USAF by USAF
BIOGRAPHICAL DATA
. life inventory *
. academic history *
. military history *
. military rank *
RISK TAKING




. performance under stress *
. emotional control *






. visual perception *
. motor coordination *
. spatial orientation *
. spatial perceptual-ability *
. perceptual speed *
APTITUDE
. pilot composites *
. non pilot composites *
. general aptitude *
( intelligence)
. numerical skills •
. verval skills •
. mechanical skills •
. flight aptitude *
MOTIVATION
. determination/desire •
. self discipline *
. satisfaction *








. aerial gunnery *






Characteristics Not Recommended Tested Not Tested






. mental health *
. consideration for others •
. personality style •
. courage *
PERSONALITY- LEADERSHIP
. responsibility for men *
in combat
. physical/combat leadership *










MED ICAL/PHYS I OLOG I CAL
. good physical health •
.= endurance •
. physical aptitude *




. selective attention *
. decision time •
. quality of combat decision *
. alertness *
. integrative decision *
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Figure C. 1 IAF Combat Pilot Training Pipeline.
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2. Special Combat Skills (Ability to:)
Obtain early visual target acquisition.
Perceive/judge target direction &
turn rate, aspect angle, angle off. . . so on.
Keep track of critical flight parameter —
( SPD, ATT, ALT, angle of attack, rG . .
.
)
Select and executive the best maneuver
to gain a firing position.
Judge when to shoot.
Shoot well ( both tracking, or raking
shot when tracking was impossible ).
Handle the throttle(s) and speed brake
(manage energe).
[eep track of the other guys - wing man,
other hostiles.
Judge when to leave the fight.
** JUDGE yourself on a scale of 1 to 9
** SCALE characteristics: 5 is average,
lower number is poor, higher number is outstanding
Figure D. 1 NPS Korean Pilot Survey Form.
74
APPENDIX E
THE RESULTS OF 'LOTUS 1.2.3 1 MODEL
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Figure E. 1 Survey Variables and Relative Weights.
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Figure E. 5 Survey Results-Desire to Achieve.
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Initiative
Figure E. 6 Survey Results-Initiative.
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5. Courage
Figure E. 7 Survey Results-Courage.
83
6. Willingness £2 Take a Risk
Figure E. 8 Survey Results-Willingness to Take a Risk.
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7. Psychological Stress Tolerance
Figure E. 9 Survey Results-Psychological Stress Tolerance.
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8. Physiological Stress Tolerance














Figure E. 1 Survey Results-Anxiety Tolerance.
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10. Xaam Hooperativeness
Figure E. 2 Survey Results-Team Cooperativeness.
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11. Endurance
Figure E. 11 Survey Results-Endurance.
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12. Leadership
Figure E. 12 Survey Results-Leadership.
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Figure E. 16 Survey Results-Pilot 4.
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Figure E. 18 Survey Results-Pilot 6.
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Figure E. 20 Survey Results-Pilot 8.
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Figure E. 21 Survey Results-Pilot 9.
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Figure E. 23 Survey Results-Pilot 11.
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12. PILOT 12
Figure E. 24 Survey Results-Pilot 12.
102
5. SPECIAL COMBAT SKILLS ANALYSIS
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Figure E. 25 Early Visual Target Acquisition.
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Figure E. 24 Select/Execute Best Maneuver.
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Figure E. 25 Perceive/Judge Target vector.
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Figure E. 24 Keep Track of the Other Aircraft.
106
















Figure E. 24 Judge When to Shoot.
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